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Abstract
We consider physicians with fixed capacity levels. If a physician’s capacity
exceeds demand, she may have an incentive to overtreat, i.e., she may pro-
vide unnecessary treatments to use up idle capacity. By contrast, with excess
demand she may undertreat, i.e., she may not provide necessary treatments
since other activities are financially more attractive. We first show that sim-
ple fee-for-service reimbursement schemes do not provide proper incentives.
If insurers use, however, fee-for-service schemes with quantity restrictions,
they solve the fraudulent physician problem.
Keywords: credence goods, expert services, incentives, medical doctors, de-
mand inducement, insurance.
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1. Introduction
The US spends between one fifth and one third of its health care expen-
ditures, that is between 500 and 700 billion dollars, on care that doesn’t
improve anybody’s health. These unnecessary tests and treatments aren’t
just expensive, they can also harm patients.1
One factor contributing to this enormous waste is that medical services
constitute credence goods: a physician not only provides the medical services;
at the same time she also acts as the expert who determines how much
treatment is necessary because her patient is unfamiliar with the medical
condition.
Aggravating this special feature is the fact that even ex post the patient
can hardly determine the extent of the treatment that was required ex ante.
It is often difficult, if not impossible, to find out whether treatments were
really needed or whether necessary treatments were not provided. Since
from ex post observations the patient can never be certain of the quality of
the treatments he obtained, such services have been termed credence goods
(Darby and Karni (1973)).
This information asymmetry creates obvious incentives for opportunistic
physician behavior. On the one hand, if there is plenty of money in treat-
ments, physicians may recommend unnecessary treatments. On the other
hand, doctors may not perform urgently needed treatments if other activi-
ties are more profitable.2
To give a few examples. In the Swiss Canton of Ticino the population
average had 33% more of the seven most important operations than medical
doctors and their families. Interestingly enough, lawyers and their beloved
have about the same operation frequency as the families of medical doctors
(Domenighetti et al. (1993)). Gruber et al. (1999) show that the frequency
of cesarian deliveries compared to vaginal deliveries positively reacts to fee
1See, e.g., Brownlee (2007, p. 5) or The Economist 02/13/1999.
2Brownlee (2007, p. 8) mentions a couple of other reasons for overtreatment: doctors
simply don’t know which treatments are most effective, they want to help patients even
when they don’t know the right thing to do, malpractice fears drive defensive medicine,
medical custom varies from region to region, one doctor often doesn’t know that another
physician has already ordered a battery of tests, and patients, being insured, ask for fancy
treatments (demand-induced supply). Yet, according to her view, the most powerful reason
for overtreatment is that doctors and hospitals get paid more for doing more.
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differentials of health insurance programs. Marty (1998) shows, using 8000
bills of Swiss general practitioners, that doctors with sufficient demand charge
significantly less per patient than doctors with excess capacity. Primary care
physicians are squeezed financially so that their numbers dwindle; at the
same time the number of the highly profitable specialists continues to rise,
leading Brownlee (2007, p. 265) to sigh: “...sometimes what we really need
is not a doctor who delivers more care but one who seems to care more...”
In this paper we analyze whether health insurers can design reimburse-
ment schemes so that physicians have no incentives to behave fraudulently.
We first show that simple fee-for-service reimbursement schemes do not pro-
vide proper incentives. If insurers use, however, fee-for-service schemes with
quantity restrictions, they solve the fraudulent physician problem.
As a workhorse we use the basic model of Emons (1997, 2001). Patients
are up for a diagnosis. Some patients are in good condition and need no
further treatment; the rest is in bad condition and needs treatment. After
the diagnosis the physician knows which condition the patient is in. She
can then treat him. The physician can only perform the treatment after a
diagnosis. We thus have economies of scope between diagnosis and treatment,
making the separation of diagnosis and treatment inefficient.3
We consider a set of physicians, each of whom has a fixed capacity: a
physician may have to ration her patients due to insufficient capacity, or
she may also end up with idle capacity. If a physician has excess demand,
she may undertreat patients, i.e., she may not provide necessary treatments
if diagnosis is financially more attractive than treatment. By contrast, with
excess capacity the physician may start to overtreat, i.e., provide unnecessary
treatments to use up idle capacity.
Insurers set reimbursement terms. To focus on the incentive effects of the
reimbursement terms, we consider the following simple mechanism to allocate
patients to physicians. Nature assigns patients randomly to the physicians.
Doctors decide how many of their patients they want to diagnose; patients
who obtain no diagnosis are referred to a second round. Having diagnosed
her patients, a doctor then decides whom to treat.
In the second round nature allocates those patients who obtained no
3This separation mechanism is often encountered in the prescription and preparation
of drugs: the physician prescribes the drugs and the pharmacist may only sell only what
has been prescribed by the doctor.
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service so far to the physicians who still have spare capacity, and so on, until
either all patients eventually found a physician or until physicians have no
more capacity left. The physicians’ aggregate capacity is just sufficient to
treat all patients non-fraudulently. Therefore, the referral process ensures
that all patients are serviced if doctors behave honestly.
Physicians are myopic profit maximizers. When they decide about the
first round of patients, they do not anticipate that in a later round they
might get referrals from colleagues.
We first analyze simple fee-for-service reimbursement schemes: the physi-
cian is paid per diagnosis and per treatment she performs. We show that
there exists no fee-for-service scheme under which all patients get non-fraudu-
lent services. Consider, for example, equal compensation prices equalizing
the profit per diagnosis with the profit per treatment. With these prices all
doctors with excess demand are indifferent between diagnosis and treatment
and, accordingly, provide honest services. Yet doctors with excess capacity
overtreat to use up their idle capacity. If, by contrast, the treatment price is
zero, the incentive to overtreat disappears and doctors with excess capacity
behave non-fraudulently. But now doctors with execss demand undertreat
because diagnosis is much more attractive than treatment. It is thus impos-
sible to find fee-for-service schemes that give both, physicians with excess
demand and physicians with excess capacity proper incentives at the same
time.
In the next step we use the fact that insurers have more information than
the individual patient. Whereas the patient has only one observation of the
physician’s behavior, the insurance company has the set of observations for
its entire clientele. In particular, the insurer knows how many of its policy
holders actually underwent treatment. In addition to the fees-for-services the
insurer can thus use a quota that states the maximum fraction of diagnosed
patients for which the insurer pays the treatment.
Obviously, this quota needs to be equal to the fraction of patients actually
in need of treatment. If the quota is lower, it enforces undertreatment; if it is
higher, it opens the door for overtreatment. It turns out that a quota equal
to the fraction of patients in need of treatment curbs overtreatment. If a
doctor wishes to overtreat to use up idle capacity, she is not reimbursed for
these treatments. We are thus only left with the problem of undertreatment
if a doctor has excess demand. This problem is solved by prices making
3
diagnosis not more attractive than treatment. With these prices a doctor
prefers providing necessary treatment to diagnosing another patient. Since
physicians with excess demand and physicians with excess capacity have
proper incentives, the referral process eventually ensures that all patients get
non-fraudulent services.
The literature on credence goods as surveyed by Dulleck and Kerschbamer
(2006) looks at one-shot relationships between the expert and her customer.
The customer has only one observation of the expert’s actions. This infor-
mation together with the outcome of his case does not allow the customer
to draw perfect inferences about the appropriateness of the treatment he has
received.4 Most of this literature considers experts operating in a market
environment. The only model we are aware of incorporating insurance in a
credence good set-up is Sülzle and Wambach (2005). They take prices as
given and analyze the impact of coinsurance on the physician’s incentives to
cheat and on the patients’ incentive to search for a second opinion. They do
not attempt to find contracts inducing non-fraudulent behavior.
In Ely and Välimäki (2003) short-lived motorists play a repeated game
with long-lived mechanics. Good mechanics prefer to act truthfully while
bad mechanics prefer to always change the engine. Each motorist observes
the repairs performed for preceding customers but has no idea whether these
repairs were appropriate.5 Good mechanics may not do necessary engine
replacements early on in the game to separate themselves from the bad me-
chanics and signal their good type to future motorists. Motorists anticipate
this incentive to undertreat to build up a good reputation and may not visit
the mechanic in the first place. Similar to us, Ely and Välimäki use the
information of the expert’s treatment history. In Ely and Välimäki prices
are exogenously given. By contrast, we also determine reimbursement prices
such that, together with the quota, experts have proper incentives and the
outcome is efficient.
4Typically, this literature assumes the undertreatment problem via inference away and
deals only with the overtreatment issue; see our discussion below.
5Ely and Välimäki assume that a motorist finds out ex post whether or not he received
the appropriate service. Strictly speaking, they do not analyze a credence good but a
horizontally differentiated experience good. Yet, the motorist takes the information about
the appropriateness of the repair with him to his grave. Thus, the following motorists
know which repair he got but do not know whether it was appropriate.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the basic model. In section three we look at fee-for-service reimbursement
schemes. In the next section we extend fee-for-services with quantity ra-
tioning. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
An agent is up for a diagnosis by a physician. During the period to come the
individual may fall ill or he may stay healthy. If the agent stays healthy, he
receives a monetary utility of 1; if he becomes sick, the utility is 0.
At the time under consideration the agent may be in good or bad condi-
tion. If the patient is in good condition, the probability of staying healthy
is qh ∈ (0, 1); if the patient is in bad condition, the probability of staying
healthy is q` ∈ (0, qh), i.e., lower than when the consumer is in good condi-
tion. Let p ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that the patient is in bad condition.
The patient does not know in which of the two conditions he is in, nor can
he infer it ex post since he may fall ill or stay healthy under both conditions.
The patient visits one of n medical doctors, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n; in
what follows we will suppress the index i wherever possible. By diagnosing
the agent, the physician detects his true condition. When the patient is in
good condition, he needs no further treatment. When the consumer is in bad
condition, the doctor can treat him; after the treatment the consumer is in
good condition. Let d > 0 be the total resource cost of diagnosing and r > 0
the resource cost of treating a patient.6
The timing of the production decisions, however, is such that these costs
are not experienced as genuine marginal costs. The physician has L units
of time (say, hours) available. She allocates her L units of time to diagnosis
and treatment; d is the time the doctor needs per diagnosis and r the time
per treatment. The physician’s time cost is sunk.
The physician’s reservation wage is normalized to 1. Accordingly, L is
the sunk cost of being active; d and r measure the minimum average costs
of diagnosis and treatment if, say, the doctor performs either activity exclu-
sively. Note that marginal costs are different from average costs. A doctor
6Our diagnosis corresponds to Dulleck and Kerschbamer’s (2006) cheap treatment;
their expensive treatment corresponds to our “diagnosis cum treatment”. The information
structure in De Jaegher’s (2009) prevention scenario is similar to ours except that he has
an additional moral hazard problem in treatment.
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has a fixed capacity the cost of which is sunk. Therefore, her marginal costs
are 0 except for the capacity margin where marginal costs are “+∞”. When,
in the following, we talk about minimum average costs we mean d and r.
There is a continuum of identical consumers with total mass 1.7 In units
of time a capacity of d + pr is necessary to serve the entire market non-
fraudulently. We assume Li < d + pr, i = 1, . . . , n; each physician does not
have the capacity to serve the entire market honestly. Define λi = Li/(d+pr)
as the doctor’s capacity in terms of customers given non-fraudulent behav-
ior. Let
∑n
i=1 λi = 1; altogether the capacity in the market is just sufficient
to serve everybody honestly. This assumption implies first of all that if a
physician has excess demand, referrals to a colleague are a efficient given
non-fraudulent behavior. Moreover, it allows us to easily determine prices
allowing doctors to recover just their sunk cost L with non-fraudulent ser-
vices.8
Consumers are risk neutral and care only about monetary flows. Ac-
cordingly, given that we have normalized the utility of staying healthy to 1
monetary unit, without diagnosis and treatment a consumer’s expected util-
ity is Ū = (1− p)qh + pq`. With (honest) diagnosis and treatment priced at
minimum average costs the consumer’s expected utility amounts to qh−d−pr.
The consumer incurs the cost of diagnosis in any case. With probability p the
consumer is in bad condition and needs treatment. In return, the consumer
is in good condition for sure.
It is efficient to diagnose the consumer and treat him if necessary, meaning
qh−d− pr > Ū or p(qh− q`) > d+ pr. Treating a consumer in bad condition
increases his utility by (qh − q`). With probability p the consumer is in bad
condition. Accordingly, the expected benefit from diagnosing and treating
7We make the continuum assumption not only for notational convenience. With a
finite number of consumers we run into the following problem. Suppose the physician
expects a clientele with (1− p) patients in good and p patients in bad condition. With a
finite number of customers, however, the actual realization of her clientele will typically
be different from the expected one. Accordingly, at the end of the day she will realize
that she has either insufficient or excess capacity and she will start behaving fraudulently
(suggesting that it is better to see a doctor in the morning rather than late afternoon).
With a continuum of patients we do not encounter this difficulty. If L measures, say,
capacity per year, finiteness is less of a problem than if L is the capacity per day because
the number of patients is larger.
8Referrals are also efficient if
∑n
i=1 λi > 1; the determination of zero-profit prices is,
however, more cumbersome.
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the consumer is p(qh−q`). The surplus the physician’s services may generate
is, therefore, p(qh − q`)− (d+ pr).
Let us now describe how a doctor may defraud her patients. After di-
agnosis the physician knows which condition the patient is in. When the
patient is in bad condition, she can treat him, i.e., turn him into good con-
dition. Yet she can also ‘treat’ a patient in good condition; in this case the
physician unnecessarily spend r units of time on the patient — leaving him at
least in good condition. This kind of behavior has been termed overtreatment
(Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)) or supplier-induced demand in health eco-
nomics (Labelle et al. (1994)).
Alternatively, when the patient is in good condition, the medical doctor
can recommend no treatment. Nevertheless, she can make the same recom-
mendation when the patient is in bad condition. We will refer to this type
of fraud as undertreatment (Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)).9
Ex post the patient has no way of finding out whether he was treated
unnecessarily or whether he needed treatment that was not provided. The
physician’s services thus constitute ‘credence’ goods as distinct from search
and experience goods — from ex post observations the consumer can never
be certain of the quality of the services he has purchased. See Darby and
Karni (1973).
Note that we assume diagnosis and treatment to be verifiable. This as-
sumption is appropriate for physicians whose patients necessarily take part
in any (un-)necessary treatment. It is not appropriate for, e.g., a customer
who sends his gadget to a service center. When the widget is returned the
customer is unable to tell whether somebody in the repair center has ac-
tually worked on the gadget. Here the expert has yet another possibility
to defraud her customers. She can claim to have fixed the widget without
having touched it, thus collecting repair fees from an unlimited number of
customers.10
9Most of the credence goods literature assumes the undertreatment problem away by
setting qh = 1. Under this assumption a patient knows for sure that he didn’t get the
necessary treatment when he falls ill. Moreover, the patient’s health status is verifiable
and a legal rule holds the physician liable if the patient becomes sick; see, e.g., Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2006).
10See, e.g., Emons (2001) or Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for set-ups where the
expert’s actions are not verifiable.
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All patients have full insurance from one of m insurance companies, in-
dexed by j = 1, . . . ,m. Insurers reimburse the physicians. The sequence
of the events is as follows. Insurance companies choose identical reimburse-
ment terms. In the first round all n doctors announce that they have free
capacity. Then patients decide which doctor to see. We model this allo-
cation decision as a move by nature determining the fraction of patients ηi
visiting physician i, i = 1, . . . , n with
∑n
i=1 ηi = 1. Formally, nature chooses
from a continuous density over the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex. Therefore,
(η1, . . . , ηn) 6= (λ1, . . . , λn) with probability 1, meaning some doctors have
excess demand while others have excess capacity. Physician i then decides
how many patients µi ≤ ηi she diagnoses; ηi− µi patients are referred to the
second round. After having diagnosed her µi patients, doctor i then decides
whom to treat.
In the second round all doctors with free capacity announce this fact;
physicians who have used up their capacity in the first round drop out. Na-
ture then allocates the patients who obtained no service so far to those doc-
tors with free capacities like in the first round and so on. The process is over
when either all patients eventually found a physician or if physicians have no
more capacity left. If a patient doesn’t find a doctor willing to take him, he
ends up with his reservation utility of Ū .
Medical doctors maximize profits; since all costs are sunk in our frame-
work, profit maximization boils down to revenue maximization. Moreover,
we assume physicians to be myopic. They maximize profits for each round
of patients. Specifically, when they decide about the first round of patients,
they do not anticipate that in a later round they might get some referrals
from colleagues. Doctors thus go shortsightedly go for the quick buck. There
is no discounting between rounds.11 Insurers try to find reimbursement terms
that induce non-fraudulent behavior and generate zero-profits for physicians
11Alternatively, we could assume that physicians discount profits so that they prefer
profits in the first round to profits in the second round. Then a doctor with idle capacity
in the first round compares the profit from overtreatment now with the expected profit
she can make if she carries over the capacity into the next round. If the discount factor is
sufficiently small, she will also go for the quick buck. With discounting, the determination
of prices yielding zero profits becomes, however, more cumbersome; moreover, we need
to determine expected profits for later rounds. Finally, we consider the assumption that
physicians fully anticipate the workings of the market somewhat far-fetched.
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with honest services.12 We will now look at different reimbursement schemes.
3. Fee-for-service
Under a simple fee-for-service reimbursement scheme the physician gets D
per performed diagnosis and R per performed treatment.
Recall that a doctor has a capacity of L units of time having a sunk cost L.
In terms of patients the physician has capacity λ < 1 given honest behavior.
Apparently, her behavior depends on the size of her clientele η relative to
her capacity λ. According to whether η R λ we will say that the physician
has too many/enough/not enough patients given non-fraudulent behavior.
If, say, the doctor does not have enough patients, she may start ‘treating’
patients in good condition to utilize her otherwise idle capacities. If she has
too many patients, she may, e.g., be tempted not to treat all patients in bad
condition given that diagnosis is more profitable than treatment.
The last example indicates that the physician’s incentives also depend on
the relative profitability of diagnosis to treatment which, in turn, is deter-
mined by the prices D and R. If the doctor has too many patients, the only
constraint she faces (at the margin) is her precious time. To maximize prof-
its, she compares the profit per hour treatment (R− r)/r with the profit per
hour diagnosis (D − d)/d. If the former exceeds the latter she will overtreat
whereas she will undertreat if diagnosis is more profitable than treatment.
We specify these ideas more precisely in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1:
i) If η > λ, the physician is honest if and only if R = rD/d;
ii) if η = λ, the doctor is honest if and only if R ≤ rD/d;
iii) if η < λ, the doctor is honest if and only if R = 0.
Proof: i) If η > λ, the doctor has more patients than she can handle with
honest behavior. Given her time constraint, she is only interested in the profit
per hour treatment (R − r)/r compared to the profit per hour diagnosis
12Non-fraudulent behavior maximizes total surplus. Zero profits ensure that physicians
are active. The insurers’ objective thus coincides with the one of a social planner who
maximizes social welfare subject to the constraint that physicians cannot be forced to
practice.
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(D − d)/d. If R = rD/d, which implies (R − r)/r = (D − d)/d, she is
indifferent between diagnosis and treatment and, therefore, behaves honestly.
If R > rD/d, she prefers treatment to diagnosis and thus overtreats and
undertreats if R < rDi/d.
ii) If η = λ, the physician fully utilizes her capacity with non-fraudulent
behavior. If R < rD/d, she strictly prefers diagnosis to treatment; yet she
makes diagnoses for her entire clientele. She has to perform treatments to use
up her remaining time L−ηd; honestly treating the patients in bad condition
of her clientele just exhausts her capacity. IfR = rD/d, the argument is along
similar lines as i). If R > rD/d, the physician strongly prefers treatment to
diagnosis. Hence, she will treat all patients she diagnoses.
iii) If η < λ, the doctor has idle capacity with honest behavior. As long
as R > 0, she makes money by treating some more patients to use her idle
capacity. Only when R = 0 the incentive for overtreatment disappears. 
d
r
Figure 1: The equal compensation and the zero-profit lines
/R rD d
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The message of Lemma 1 can be seen in Figure 1. Consider the line
R = rD/d along which (R − r)/r = (D − d)/d. Accordingly, on this equal
compensation line the physician is indifferent between diagnosis and treat-
ment so that with too many patients she opts for efficient treatment: She
diagnoses µ = λ patients and treats the fraction p thereof; she refers the
remaining (η − λ) patients to the second round.
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In region (I) where R > rD/d the doctor prefers treatment to diagnosis.
Whatever the number of patients, she will ‘treat’ everybody she diagnoses,
i.e., she will overtreat. In region (II) in which R < rD/d the physician
prefers diagnosis to treatment so that she wishes to increase the number
of diagnoses at the expense of treatments. If the physician has too many
patients, we will observe undertreatment. With enough patients, however,
she cannot diagnose more patients; she treats efficiently to make some money
out of her otherwise unused capacity.
When the physician does not have enough patients, she will treat every-
body as long as R > 0. Only when R = 0 the physician has proper incentives
if she does not have enough patients. She does not overtreat to utilize her
idle capacity because there is no money in treatment.
Lemma 1 has the following negative implication:
Proposition 1: If insurers use simple fee-for-service reimbursement schemes
(D,R), there exists no set of prices under which all patients get non-fraudulent
services.
Proof: If R > rD/d, all doctors overtreat regardless of their demand. (d +
pr)/(d+r) patients get a diagnosis and a treatment; (1−p) of these treatment
are unnecessary. (1−(d+pr)/(d+r)) patients end up with no medical services
at all.
If R = rD/d, all physicians with enough and too many customers have
proper incentives and refer efficiently. Yet those doctors with excess capacity
overtreat in each round. They don’t have the capacity in later rounds to
serve the referrals of their colleagues non-fraudulently. Thus, some patients
are overtreated which implies that some patients end up with no service at
all.
If 0 < R < rD/d, physicians with excess demand undertreat, i.e., some of
their patients don’t get the necessary treatment. By contrast, doctors with
excess capacity overtreat. Whether or not some patients end up with no
service depends on the demand realization in each round.
If R = 0, physicians with excess capacity have correct incentives and refer
efficiently. Yet, physicians with excess demand undertreat. All patients are
diagnosed, yet some patients are denied the necessary treatment. 
In Figure 1 we have also depicted the line R = (d + pr − D)/p. All
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prices along this line generate zero-profits with λi patients and non-fraudulent
behavior. Suppose, for example, the insurance companies reimburse equal
compensation prices (d, r). Then the physicians with enough or too many
customer have proper incentives and refer efficiently; furthermore, they make
zero profits. Yet, those physicians with excess capacity will overtreat. There-
fore, after the first round the market has no longer the capacity to deal with
the referred patients non-fraudulently.
If insurers use, say, the fully capitated reimbursement (d + pr, 0), physi-
cians have proper incentives with enough or too few patients.13 Yet, those
doctors with excess demand will undertreat. Accordingly, in the second
round there is excess capacity in the market.
Note that this negative result is driven by the physician’s fixed capacity.
In a set-up where experts only incur variable costs, equal compensation prices
always induce honest behavior; see, e.g., Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).14
4. Fee-for-service with Quantity Restrictions
Let us now use the fact that an insurance company has more information
than an individual patient. Whereas the patient has only one observation of
the physician’s behavior, the insurance company has the set of observations
for its entire clientele. In particular, the insurer knows how many of its
policy holders actually underwent treatment. To be more specific, let ηij > 0
be the fraction of physician’s i’s patients having insurance from firm j with∑m
j=1 ηij = ηi.
Insurers offer reimbursement schemes (D,R, z) where z denotes the max-
imum fraction of diagnosed patients for whom the insurer actually pays the
treatment. It turns out that the quota z is a powerful instrument to curb
overtreatment.
First note that to implement non-fraudulent behavior we need z = p. If
z < p, the insurer enforces undertreatment. If, by contrast, z > p, we run
into the problems as described by Lemma 1.
13With enough patients the physician makes zero profits; with excess capacity, however,
she makes losses.
14In Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) doctors have no capacity constraint so that equal
compensation (equal markup) prices satisfy R− r = D− d. Another set-up with capacity
constrained experts can be found in Richardson (1999).
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Lemma 2: Let z = p.
i) If η > λ, the physician is honest if and only if R ≥ rD/d;
ii) if η ≤ λ, the doctor is honest for all prices (D,R).
Proof: i) If η > λ, the physician has more patients than she can handle
with honest behavior. If R < rD/d, she prefers diagnosis to treatment. She
diagnoses all η patients and uses her remaining capacity (if any) to treat a
few patients. We have thus undertreatment.
If R = rD/d, the physician is indifferent between diagnosis and treatment
and, therefore, honestly deals with λ patients.
If R > rD/d, the physician prefers treatment to diagnosis. She would
like to treat all patients she diagnoses. Yet she can bill treatments only for
the fraction p of the patients she diagnoses. To use up her capacity, she
diagnoses λ patients and treats the fraction p thereof being in bad condition.
ii) If η = λ, the physician fully uses her capacity with non-fraudulent
behavior. If R = rD/d she has proper incentives and uses up her capacity
by honestly serving all patients. If R < rD/d, she prefers diagnosis to
treatment. She diagnoses all patients; to use up her remaining time L − ηd
she has to treat. Honestly treating the patients in bad condition just exhausts
her capacity. If R > rD/d, the doctor prefers treatment to diagnosis. She
would like to treat all patients but is curbed by the quota p. Hence, she
behaves honestly.
If η < λ, the physician has unused capacity with non-fraudulent behavior.
As long as D > 0, she will diagnose all η patients. As long as R > 0, she
would like to treat more than pη patients to use her idle capacity. Yet she
cannot bill more than pη patients for treatment. 
It is perhaps somewhat surprising that the quota z = p induces honest
behavior for all prices if the physician has enough or not enough demand.
With excess capacity the physician diagnoses all patients. As long as R > 0,
she would like to overtreat to use her idle capacity. Yet the reimbursement
quota prevents her from doing so. By contrast, if the physician has excess
demand, diagnosis may not be more attractive than treatment. If diagnosis
is relatively more profitable than treatment, the physician will diagnose all
patients she can get hold of and treat less than the fraction p thereof, i.e.,
we have undertreatment.
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Lemma 2 implies the following result:
Proposition 2: Under the reimbursement schemes (D, (d + pr − D)/d, p)
with D ≤ d all patients get non-fraudulent service and all physicians make
zero-profits.
Proof: Lemma 2 implies that for reimbursement schemes (D, (d+pr−D)/d, p)
with D ≤ d physicians have proper incentives whatever their demand. Hence
doctors with excess demand service λi patients honestly and refer ηi−λi pa-
tients to the second round. Physicians with excess capacity treat ηi patients
honestly and enter the second round with capacity λi − ηi. Since
∑
i λi = 1,∑
{i|ηi>λi}(ηi − λi) =
∑
{i|ηi<λi}(λi − ηi); the remaining physicians have the
capacity to handle the remaining patients honestly, and so on for further
rounds.
In each round at least one doctor has excess demand, uses up her entire
capacity, and is no longer active in the following round. The referral process
thus comes to an end after a finite number of rounds and each doctor has
used up her capacity with non-fraudulent services. In the last round only
one physician remains whose capacity is just sufficient to serve the remaining
patients honestly. Finally, note that the prices (D, (d+pr−D)/d) with D ≤ d
together with honest behavior and demand λi yield revenue L so that doctors
end up with zero profits. 
There exist thus reimbursement schemes (D,R, z) inducing non-fraudulent
behavior for all realizations of demand. Any physician with excess demand
will refer the patients she cannot deal with honestly to the next round. Any
physician with excess capacity behaves non-fraudulently, meaning that she
has capacity left to treat the referrals from colleagues. Since we have assumed
that
∑
i λi = 1, at the end of referral process each physician has enough cus-
tomers. Thus, incentive compatible prices on the line R = (d + pr − D)/p
together with the quota z = p indeed yield zero profits. Note that for our
scheme to work, an insurer need not know the physician’s capacity level.15
15Assessing a physician’s capacity is a tricky task. For example, in Switzerland a lot
of -in particular female- physicians prefer to work part- rather than full-time, making
her capacity level her private information. Any reimbursement scheme that builds on a
physician’s capacity level, therefore, has to deal with the issue how this information is
revealed.
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A few qualifying remarks are in order. We have assumed that the number
of patients is a continuum. Each physician serves a fraction of the market.
Therefore, a doctor’s clientele is also a continuum. We assume that a con-
tinuum of independent and identically distributed random variables sum to
a non-random variable.16 To be more specific, a physician has continuum of
patients, the fraction p of which is in need of treatment; see also the discus-
sion in footnote 7. The reimbursement quota z = p, therefore, coincides with
the actual number of patients in need of treatment.
With a finite number of patients, the actual number of patients in need
of treatment will typically be different from the expected value. If the actual
number exceeds z, the quota enforces undertreatment so that some patients
do not get necessary treatment; if it is lower, the quota opens the door to
overtreatment. With a finite number of patients the optimal quota minimizes
the expected costs from under- and overtreatment. By working with the
continuum we have avoided this technical difficulty. Nevertheless, the larger
the number of patients a doctor handles, the less important this problem
becomes.
Another difficulty arises if patients are not identical as in our setup. Sup-
pose the probability of being in need of the treatment is distributed in the
population on [0, 1] with mean p, the density having full support. As long
as each physician gets a random sample of the population as patients, our
results continue to hold. If, however, there is a selection bias such that some
physicians get on average less healthy patients than others, our one-size-fits-
all quota no longer gives proper incentives for all physicians. The quota then
has to be adjusted to the group of patients seeing the doctor.
We have assumed that only one treatment is available and thus that the
fraction of patients in need of treatment is well defined. Often there are,
however, professional disagreements covering the diagnosis and treatment of
illness. For example, Wennberg et al. (1982) show that the wide range of
acceptable diagnoses and therapies are a major factor in the wide variation
in rates of of utilization and costs of medical services among neighboring
medical markets. Our analysis, therefore, applies to diseases where there are
no professional disagreements, or to cases where insurers enforce the most
effective way of dealing with the illness.
16See Judd (1985) for a discussion of this assumption.
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Despite these shortcomings of our simple model, we think that treatment
quotas are a useful instrument for insurers to curb overtreatment incentives.
As to our knowledge, insurers tend to make little use of this instrument.
For example, in Switzerland insurers start an investigation if a physician’s
actual billing per patient is 30% higher than the average for this group of
doctors.17 Given our results, a more sophisticated use of treatment records
seems warranted.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to develop incentive compatible reimbursement
schemes for physicians. We have chosen a framework where due to the physi-
cians’ fixed capacity levels both, the problem of under- and of overtreatment
arise. Simple fee-for-service schemes do not solve the incentive problems. Ei-
ther physicians with excess capacity or physicians with excess demand have
the wrong incentives.
We then use the fact that insurers observe a physician’s actions for the
entire set of their policy holders. This allows insurers to set a quota which
states the maximum fraction of diagnosed patients for whom insurers actu-
ally pay the treatment. If insurers set this quota equal to the fraction of
patients in need of treatment, they curb overtreatment. Therefore, only the
undertreatment problem remains which is solved by prices making diagnosis
not more attractive than treatment.
17For more on this so called ANOVA-method see, e.g., Roth and Stahel (2005).
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